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† J.D. candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Japanese Language,
University of Minnesota, 1997. Special appreciation to Sylvia Iijima, Wesley Iijima, and
Ann Iijima for their encouragement and support.

755

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 15
15 IIJIMA - PAGINATED.DOC

756

1/13/2004 3:52 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

1

granting permission. Minnesota policy attempts to guarantee recovery
for automobile accident victims, and is the overriding factor in deciding
2
the outcome of motor vehicle injury cases.
This note explores the Christensen decision and its effect on motor
3
vehicle owner liability in Minnesota. First, the note presents a historical
perspective from which to view the Christensen decision and
4
Minnesota’s motor vehicle liability and conversion laws. Next, the note
5
summarizes the factual and procedural history of the Christensen case.
Then the note discusses the Minnesota Supreme Court holding in
6
Christensen. The note goes further to present a policy and legal analysis
7
of the Christensen decision. Further, the note suggests an amendment to
allow evenhanded treatment of vehicle owners, while satisfying state
8
policy. The note concludes that the Christensen decision is a necessary
extension of existing legal interpretation because it supports Minnesota
9
and tort law goals by ensuring compensation to injured accident victims.
II. A NATIONAL HISTORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
The automobile “threw America’s industrial revolution into
overdrive,” created the middle class, and has become a symbol of
10
American life.
Automobiles also injure and kill millions of people
1. 658 N.W.2d 580, 588 (Minn. 2003) (Blatz, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating vehicle owners will be liable in every circumstance except
theft).
2. See id. at 587 (stating negligence will not be found where it contravenes public
policy); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 16566 (Minn. 1983) (stating the legislature and supreme court adopt and interpret acts to
favor public policy and that public policy is to give injured persons an “approximate
certainty” of relief) (quoting Hutchings v. Bourdages, 291 Minn. 211, 214, 189 N.W.2d
706, 709 (1971) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 485 cmt. b (1939))); Lange
v. Potter, 270 Minn. 173, 178, 132 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1965) (refusing to adopt an
interpretation of vicarious liability that would narrow or defeat public policy); Bates v.
Armstrong, 603 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding no conversion and
giving weight to public policy goals).
3. See infra Parts II-VI.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part IV.A-B.
8. See infra Part V.
9. See infra Part VI.
10. Lee A. Iacocca, Driving Force—Henry Ford, TIME, Dec. 7, 1998, at 78. “[I]f it
hadn’t been for Henry Ford’s drive to create a mass market for cars, America wouldn’t
have a middle class today.” Id. at 79. E. B. White tells us that in the early 1900s, the
Ford Model T “practically was the American scene,” and that “[f]lourishing industries
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11

each year.
Throughout the last century, legislatures and courts have
looked to common law theories and enacted statutes to protect and
12
provide for the injured.
A. Respondeat Superior
Under the English common law theory of respondeat superior, also
termed vicarious liability, a master was liable when his servants
13
committed torts. The practical application of respondeat superior led to
the theory of the “deep pocket,” under which courts held employers
14
liable to injured parties solely on the basis of financial security.
Today, courts hold employers liable for their employees’ negligent
15
acts.
The primary contention is that injury is an inherent risk of
16
Consequently, public policy favors placing
conducting business.
fell and rose with it.” E. B. WHITE, FAREWELL TO MODEL T; FROM SEA TO SHINING SEA 9
(2003). He added that “[a]s a vehicle, [the Model T] was hard-working, commonplace,
heroic; and it often seemed to transmit those qualities to the persons who rode in it.” Id.
at 9-10.
11. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 2001, at 681, 684, 686 tbls. 1087, 1092, 1095 (121st ed. 2001)
(listing 216,309,000 motor vehicle registrations and 11,400,000 motor vehicle accidents,
causing 41,717 deaths and 3,236,000 injuries in 1999).
12. See infra Part II.A-C.
13. Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1997) (defining vicarious
liability as the “imposition of liability on one person for the actionable conduct of
another, based solely on a relationship between the two persons”) (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990)); Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 404, 211
N.W.2d 783, 785-86 (1973) (stating the master is liable for the servant’s acts where the
master and servant’s acts may be treated as one indivisible tort); Meyers v. Tri-State
Auto. Co., 121 Minn. 68, 71, 140 N.W. 184, 184 (1913); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984).
14. See T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154 (1916) (“In hard fact, the real reason for
employers’ liability is . . . the damages are taken from a deep pocket.”). Courts in a
number of jurisdictions have quoted this phrase. See Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133,
139 (Alaska 1972); Theophelis v. Lansing Gen. Hosp., 424 N.W.2d 478, 482-83 (Mich.
1988); Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 141 A.2d 276, 296 (N.J. 1958).
15. See, e.g., Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905,
910 (Minn. 1999) (“[A]cts committed within the scope of employment should be
allocated to the employer as a cost of engaging in that business.”).
16. Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d
306, 314 (Minn. 1982) (Peterson, J., dissenting). Two other justifications for vicarious
liability are that the employer has the control over the employees, and that an employer
who takes benefit from her employees’ acts should share the risk of those acts. Id. at
313-14. Weckerly v. Abear, 256 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1977) (“[R]espondeat superior
commonly is justified as a socially desirable distribution of risk and as a device to
provide financially responsible indemnitors . . . .”); Laurie v. Mueller, 248 Minn. 1, 4, 78
N.W.2d 434, 437 (1956) (“[I]f an employer expects to derive certain advantages from the
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liability on employers, who can distribute costs to society through
17
In finding vicarious liability, courts
pricing and liability insurance.
require that an employee’s act was “foreseeable” and within the “scope
18
of employment.”
B. Emergence and Importance of Liability Insurance
Liability insurance indemnifies the insured against claims, costly
19
litigation, and financial ruin. Because liability insurance policies are
acts performed by others for him, he, as well as the careless employee, should bear the
financial responsibility for injuries occurring to innocent third persons . . . .”); Elliason v.
W. Coal & Coke Co., 162 Minn. 213, 215, 202 N.W. 485, 486 (1925) (“[R]espondeat
superior rests in part at least upon the power of the master to select, control, and dismiss
his servants.”).
17. See Weckerly, 256 N.W.2d at 81; Fahrendorff, 597 N.W.2d at 910.
18. Schneider v. Buckman, 433 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Minn. 1988) (stating that it is a
“well established principle that an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of an
employee committed within the course and scope of employment.”). See Fahrendorff,
597 N.W.2d at 912 (stating foreseeability is a test for liability). In the context of
respondeat superior, foreseeability means that “an employee’s conduct is not so unusual
or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other
costs of the employer’s business.” Id. at 912 (quoting Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co.,
124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)). The scope-of-employment requirement
exists because the basis for vicarious liability is not finding fault in the employer, but
whether the employee was conducting the employer’s business. Lange, 297 Minn. at
404, 211 N.W.2d at 786 (stating liability is based on whether an employee’s actions are
related to the employee’s duties and within the work-related limits of time and place);
Ismil v. L.H. Sowles Co., 295 Minn. 120, 123, 203 N.W.2d 354, 357 (1972); Porter v.
Grennan Bakeries, Inc., 219 Minn. 14, 21, 16 N.W.2d 906, 909-10 (1944). The phrase
“scope of employment” has defied definition and created much litigation. See Laurie,
248 Minn. at 4, 78 N.W.2d at 437 (“‘[S]cope of employment’ is impossible of concrete
definition . . . .”). See generally Lange, 297 Minn. at 399, 211 N.W.2d at 783 (discussing
the intricacies of scope of permission). Some courts have required that an employee was
acting to further an employer’s business. Lange, 297 Minn. at 401, 211 N.W.2d at 784.
Yet “it would be a rare situation where a wrongful act would actually further an
employer’s business.” Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 311. The most feasible definition to date
requires an act “related to the duties of the employee . . . within work-related limits of
time and place.” See Lange, 297 Minn. at 404, 211 N.W.2d at 786.
19. Dolly v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 200 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 n.20 (N.D. Ohio
2002) (stating that insurance companies bet against catastrophic-type claims, while the
insured pays premiums to protect against financial ruin that could result from a large
claim); Bohna v. Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, 828 P.2d 745, 754
(Alaska 1992) (stating the purpose of liability insurance was to protect from financial
ruin and to compensate for loss); Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 610 (La. 1989)
(“The purpose of liability insurance . . . is to afford the insured protection from damage
claims.”). Modern liability insurance began in England in the late 1800s. KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 585. The purpose of insurance at that time was to indemnify employers
against employers’ liability and workers compensation claims. Id. The successful
implementation of liability insurance led to demands in other high-risk areas. Id.
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contracts, courts should interpret policies to reflect the contracting
20
However, insurance policies also serve important
parties’ intent.
public interests, such as protecting accident victims and limiting
21
litigation.
As a result, some states place statutory requirements and
22
restrictions on liability insurance policies.
23
Mass production of motor vehicles began in the early 1900s.
What began as an innovative idea eventually led to a staggering number
24
Financially irresponsible drivers left many
of injuries and deaths.
25
accident victims without compensation and medical treatment. Early
legislative efforts to protect the injured began with financial
26
These laws failed to consistently compensate
responsibility laws.
20. Smith v. Matthews, 611 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (La. 1993) (“An insurance policy is
an agreement between the parties and should be interpreted by using ordinary contract
principles.”); Hoeschen v. S. C. Ins. Co., 378 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Minn. 1985) (“[L]iability
insurance contracts should, if possible, be construed so as not to be a delusion to those
who have bought them.”) (citing Taulelle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 247, 251, 207
N.W.2d 736, 739 (1973)); Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960)
(“Contracts of insurance . . . must be construed according to the terms the parties have
used, to be taken and understood . . . so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as
it appears from the entire contract.”).
21. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 subd. 1, 2 (2002). See Collins v. Randall 836 So. 2d 352,
354 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (stating “liability insurance . . . is to protect the public, and not
just the insured . . . .”); Dickinson v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 6 N.E.2d 439, 441 (Mass.
1937) (stating that an insurance policy “should be construed liberally to accomplish the
humane purpose of the Legislature to protect travellers on the highway from injury by
motor vehicles.”).
22. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49 (requiring insurance policies to contain various types
and amounts of coverage). Cf. Konrad v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 137 N.E.2d
855, 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) (stating such statutory provisions “form a part of such
contract and should be construed in connection with the policy”) (citation omitted).
23. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 244 (1973). Ford began production of
the Model T in 1908. Iacocca, supra note 10, at 76. In 1912 there were 7000 Ford
dealers in the United States, and by 1914 “the world’s first automatic conveyor belt could
churn out a car every 93 minutes.” Id. at 78. By 1927 Ford had sold 15 million cars. Id.
at 77.
24. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 11.
25. See 1 ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED & UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE §
1.1, at 3 (2d ed. 1992) (stating there have always been financially irresponsible drivers
who left victims without compensation).
26. The first financial responsibility law was enacted in Connecticut in 1925. 1925
Conn. Pub. Acts 183. By 1969 every state except Massachusetts had “inferred a general
legislative policy to protect the public from uncompensated injury by motor vehicles on
the state’s highways from the passage of such statutes as financial responsibility
laws . . . .” Mt. Beacon Ins. Co. v. Williams, 296 F. Supp. 1094, 1098 (D. Md. 1969).
These laws required a motorist who failed to satisfy a judgment against him to provide
assurance that he could satisfy future judgments. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 601.
If the motorist did not provide such assurance, he would lose his license or vehicle
registration. Id.
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27

accident victims. However, motor vehicle liability insurance arose as a
28
Legislatures
convenient method for proving financial responsibility.
29
later enacted compulsory liability insurance statutes.
This ensured
compensation for accident victims, but only where the victims could
30
Thus, victims were without recourse if they could not
prove fault.
demonstrate fault, and in a precarious position during lengthy
31
32
litigation. Sixteen states went further by enacting “no-fault” statutes,
33
which required all motor vehicle owners to carry no-fault insurance.
Under such statutes an accident victim’s own insurance company
provides compensation for medical expenses and lost wages, regardless
34
of who caused the accident. The intent behind no-fault statutes is to
avoid inadequate or excessive compensation of victims, to require motor
vehicle registrants to procure liability insurance, and to provide benefits
35
to vehicle occupants and other persons injured in accidents.

27. Three factors led to the demise of the early laws: (1) the laws came into effect
only after an accident, (2) the injured did not sue when liability would be difficult to
prove, and (3) some motorists preferred to lose driving privileges rather than provide
security. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 601-02; WIDISS, supra note 25, at 4-7.
28. See Joseph P. Murphy & Ross D. Netherton, Public Responsibility and the
Uninsured Motorist, 47 GEO. L. J. 700, 705 (1959) (“Insurance was the most obvious and
practical method of maintaining financial responsibility.”).
29. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 602-03. Forty-two states and the District
of Columbia require automobile liability insurance. Johnny Parker, The Automobile
Liability Coverage Step-Down Clause: The Real Deal or Merely the Calm Before the
Storm?, 10 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 33, 36 n.15 (2001) (quoting ROBERT H. JERRY, II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 949 (2d ed. 1999)).
30. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 603.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 607. The sixteen states are Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah. Id. at n.46.
33. See Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d 91, 96
(Minn. 2000) (stating the No-Fault Act mandates no-fault coverage). No-fault statutes
and insurance maintain a fault-based system for non-economic loss recovery, under
which parties must still sue the tortfeasor and prove fault. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.43
(2002) (“‘Loss’ means economic detriment . . . consisting only of medical expense,
income loss, [and] replacement services loss . . . .”).
34. See Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 574 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998) (“The purpose of [uninsured motorist] insurance is to take the place of
liability insurance that the tortfeasor should have purchased.”). See generally MINN.
STAT. § 65B.41-.71 (2002) (detailing the No-Fault Act).
35. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (2002).
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C. Omnibus Clauses and Permission
36

Most liability insurance policies include omnibus clauses.
In
37
some jurisdictions these clauses are a statutory requirement. Omnibus
clauses extend policy protection to unnamed parties who receive
38
permission to drive the insured vehicle.
For example, an omnibus
clause might read: “you are an insured for any covered auto and anyone
else is an insured while using with your permission a covered auto you
39
own, hire, or borrow.”
The term “permission” in the context of omnibus clauses is widely
40
debated.
Although courts treat “permission” and “consent” as
41
synonyms when interpreting omnibus clauses, the tasks of defining
42
Courts may find
permission and determining its scope remain.
36. See Christensen v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 2003)
(stating that policies contain omnibus clauses to hold owners liable for acts of
permittees); 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 225 (2003) (“[A]utomobile insurance
policies generally contain a standard omnibus clause that provides coverage to any person
using the named insured’s car, if its use is within the scope of the named insured’s
consent.”).
37. See Arnold v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 158 F. Supp. 1, 2 (S.D. Ind.
1958); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 735 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000); Trow v. Worley, 40 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); 7 AM. JUR.
2D Automobile Insurance § 22 (2003) (stating that some states have compulsory liability
insurance and omnibus provisions).
38. Kolby v. Northwest Produce Co., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
39. 16 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 271 (1992).
40. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160,
165 n.7 (Minn. 1983) (“[T]he word ‘permission’ has bred a most costly and wasteful type
of litigation.”).
41. Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 274 Minn. 297, 303, 143 N.W.2d 635, 640
(1966). See also C. T. Drechsler, Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance:
Permission or Consent to Employee’s Use of Car Within Meaning of Omnibus Coverage
Clause, 5 A.L.R.2d 600, 608 (1949) (listing other jurisdictions’ acceptance of “consent”
and “permission” as synonymous).
42. See Christensen v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 586 (Minn. 2003)
(finding permission when an employee violates express limitation by driving under the
influence and using employer’s van for his own purposes); Allied Mut. Cas. Co., 274
Minn. at 305, 143 N.W.2d at 641 (finding coverage when a mother limited vehicle use to
driving to a movie theater, but daughter and daughter’s friend did not go to a movie and
instead drove to another town); Anderson v. Hedges Motor Co., 282 Minn. 217, 222, 164
N.W.2d 364, 368 (1969) (finding no permission where mechanic was to repair the
owner’s vehicle, had prior permission to use the vehicle for personal errands, but used the
vehicle a second time for personal reasons); Abbey v. N. States Power Co., 199 Minn. 41,
46, 271 N.W. 122, 124 (1937) (finding no permission where an electric company
employee was to raise wires above a house that was being moved, and the employee used
the vehicle to procure equipment for the house mover).
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permission to use a vehicle through express words, or may imply
43
Most jurisdictions have
permission from the general circumstances.
adopted one of three rules interpreting the scope of permission in
44
omnibus clauses.
The “strict” or “conversion” rule is the least accepted
45
interpretation. Under this rule, the slightest deviation from permission
46
in time, place, or use defeats liability under the omnibus clause. Of the
three, this rule most accurately represents the intent of the contracting
47
parties and is the most favorable to vehicle owners.
However, the
“strict” rule runs contrary to public interest in providing recovery to
48
injured persons.
The initial permission rule, also termed the “liberal” or “hell or high
water” rule, extends omnibus coverage even for ludicrous deviations
49
from permission.
Jurisdictions that adopt the initial permission rule
tend to focus on public policy and accident victims rather than on owners
50
and insurers. The initial permission rule serves three purposes: (1) to
further public policy and protect accident victims from financial ruin, (2)
to discourage lenders and lendees from conspiring to escape liability, and
51
(3) to reduce litigation. On the other hand, the initial permission rule
43. Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 584.
44. Id. (citing Drechsler, supra note 41, at 622).
45. See Drechsler, supra note 41, at 625.
46. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ragatz, 571 N.W.2d 155, 159 (S.D. 1997).
47. See 18 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 at 433 (1992) (stating that “the actual
use . . . must be the exact use that was contemplated when permission or consent was
granted,” and that the “strict” rule favors the insurer).
48. See 8 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 113:7 (3d
ed. 1997) (“[C]ourts should be encouraged to adopt a less strict rule in light of the
legislative history and public policy which favors finding coverage where reasonably
possible.”).
49. Christensen v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 587 (Minn. 2003)
(stating that ludicrous uses are within permission “as long as they do not constitute theft
or conversion”) (quoting Raitz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 1179, 1183,
1187 n.15 (Colo. 1998)).
50. See 18 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 at 433 (1992) (stating some jurisdictions
adopt the rule to further public policy to provide insurance protection to as many people
as possible).
51. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 166
(Minn. 1983). See also Vanliner Ins. Co. v. Sampat, 320 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 2003)
(stating the initial permission rule “is based on the theory that . . . it is not in the public
interest to permit litigation on the details of a permission and use”); Manzella v. Doe, 664
So. 2d 398, 402 (La. 1995) (“[O]ne justification for this rule is that it prevents collusion
between the lender and the lendee to avoid liability.”); North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Raincloud, 563 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Minn. 1997) (stating the purpose is to “protect the
public at large on public roads and highways”); Barry v. Tanner, 547 N.W.2d 730, 733
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“lends itself to gross abuse by an unscrupulous individual who, in
violation of his express instructions, might retain possession of the
automobile indefinitely and operate it over unlimited territory with the
52
insurance still in effect.”
Jurisdictions differ over whether omnibus
clause coverage should extend to second permittees who have permission
53
from original permittees.
The minor deviation rule or “moderate” rule voids coverage after
material or gross deviation from the insured’s permission, but sustains
54
coverage for slight deviations.
The minor deviation rule is a
55
compromise between the “strict” rule and the initial permission rule. It
“furthers the public policy of compensating victims, recognizes that
permittees are engaged in various activities and may stray from the exact
56
letter of their permission, and . . . attempts to be fair to the insurer. . . .”
Arguments against the minor deviation rule are that it encourages
litigation over what constitutes a “minor deviation,” and that it does not
57
ensure coverage for injured parties.
D. Vicarious Liability in Minnesota
Historically, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held vehicle owners
58
The Safety
vicariously liable for the acts of their permittees.
Responsibility Act (“SRA”), initial permission rule, and the Minnesota
No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (“No-Fault Act”) are further
59
evidence of Minnesota’s focus on accident victims.
(Neb. 1996) (“Proponents of this rule justify it on the ground that it is good public policy
to protect persons injured in automobile accidents against uninsured motorists.”).
52. Gulla v. Reynolds, 85 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ohio 1949).
53. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ragatz, 571 N.W.2d 155, 158 (S.D. 1997).
54. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 165.
55. Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 274 Minn. 297, 305, 143 N.W.2d 635, 640
(1966).
56. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 571 N.W.2d at 160.
57. Verriest v. INA Underwriters Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 967, 972 (N.J. 1995) (citing
Matits v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 166 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1960)).
58. See Turner v. Gackle, 168 Minn. 514, 515, 209 N.W. 626, 627 (1926) (holding
defendant liable for his father’s conduct where car was owned for family and business,
but no express permission was granted to the father); Jaffa v. Libman, 153 Minn. 557,
557, 190 N.W. 894, 894 (1922) (holding defendant liable for minor son driving with
permission); Johnson v. Evans, 141 Minn. 356, 360, 170 N.W. 220, 221-22 (1919)
(implying permission and holding defendant liable for son who had permission to drive to
one town, but traveled to another); Ploetz v. Holt, 124 Minn. 169, 174, 144 N.W. 745,
747 (1913) (stating that a father may be liable where a son used a family vehicle for
personal purposes).
59. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 166-67.
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1. The Safety Responsibility Act
60

The legislature passed the SRA in 1933, and codified it as
61
The SRA expanded the
Minnesota Statute section 170.54 in 1945.
operative field of respondeat superior to make vehicle owners vicariously
62
liable when their permittees injured third parties. The SRA states that
“[w]henever any motor vehicle shall be operated within this state, by any
person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or
implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed the
63
agent of the owner of such motor vehicle in the operation thereof.”
The purpose of the SRA was “to make the owner of motor vehicles liable
to those injured by their operation . . . where no such liability would
64
otherwise exist.”
The legislature believed that the SRA would
encourage vehicle owners to procure liability insurance and ensure
65
recovery for accident victims. Minnesota courts liberally construe the
66
SRA to serve these purposes.
a. The Minor Deviation Rule
In the early and mid-1900s, Minnesota courts used the minor
67
deviation rule to define the scope of permission under the SRA. The
minor deviation rule relieved vehicle owners from liability where
servants, employees, and others acted grossly outside the owner’s initial
68
grant of permission. The determining factor in motor vehicle liability
60. 1933 Minn. Laws 351.
61. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1945).
62. See Clemens v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 971, 973 (D. Minn. 1950).
63. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1945).
64. Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 274 Minn. 297, 301, 143 N.W.2d 635, 638
(1966) (citing Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 409, 10 N.W.2d 406,
415 (1943)).
65. Shuck v. Means, 302 Minn. 93, 96, 226 N.W.2d 285, 287 (1974); Boatwright v.
Budak, 625 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Minn. 1983)).
66. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 165; Lange v. Potter, 270 Minn. 173,
178, 132 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1965).
67. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 162 (stating the early cases in
essence applied the minor deviation rule).
68. See Lausche v. Denison-Harding Chevrolet Co., 185 Minn. 635, 638, 243 N.W.
52, 53-54 (1932) (finding no permission when employee had permission to drive
employer’s car home, but employee used vehicle to attend a carnival after drinking);
Langan v. Nathanson, 161 Minn. 433, 437, 201 N.W. 927, 928 (1925) (finding an
employee who took another employee to a physician was outside the scope of
permission); Mogle v. A. W. Scott Co., 144 Minn. 173, 177, 174 N.W. 832, 834 (1919)
(finding no permission when an employee used a company-owned vehicle for work, then
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eventually became whether the permittee was outside the express
restrictions or uses contemplated by the parties at the “time and place” of
69
an accident.
b. The Initial Permission Rule
In 1969, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the minor deviation
rule in Anderson v. Hedges Motor Co., but noted that only a liberal
interpretation of the SRA could achieve the public policy goal of
70
compensating injured parties. That early realization foreshadowed the
71
1982 decision in Jones v. Fleischhacker. The Jones court adopted the
initial permission rule for the limited purpose of holding adults liable for
72
a minor’s negligent vehicle use.
The following year, in Milbank
Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., the
court expanded the Jones decision to include adult-to-adult
73
transactions. In doing so, the Milbank court overruled previous minor
74
Under the initial permission rule,
deviation rule-based decisions.
“when the owner of a motor vehicle grants another person permission to
use the vehicle, major departures from the initial scope of permission,
short of conversion or theft, do not relieve the owner from vicarious
75
liability for the permittee’s negligent use of the vehicle.”
Although
vicarious liability under both the minor deviation rule and the initial
permission rule is contingent upon permission, the initial permission rule

drove family members to the park); Wilde v. Pearson, 140 Minn. 394, 397, 168 N.W.
582, 583-84 (1918) (finding no permission when a minor permitted a third party to drive
a family vehicle, and the third party drove the vehicle in absence of said minor).
69. See Anderson v. Hedges Motor Co., 282 Minn. 217, 220, 164 N.W.2d 364, 367
(1969); Eicher v. Universal Underwriters, 250 Minn. 7, 14, 83 N.W.2d 895, 899 (1957);
Truman v. United Prods. Corp., 217 Minn. 155, 159-60, 14 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1944);
Ranthum v. Ferguson, 202 Minn. 209, 212, 277 N.W. 547, 548 (1938); PattersonStocking v. Dunn Bros. Storage Warehouses, 201 Minn. 308, 312, 276 N.W. 737, 739
(1937).
70. Anderson, 282 Minn. at 218, 164 N.W.2d at 366.
71. 325 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. 1982) (stating public policy requires holding
parents liable for the acts of a child even though the minor disobeyed the parents’
instructions).
72. See id.
73. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 167
(Minn. 1983) (holding an employer liable for acts of an employee regardless of any
limitations put on vehicle use).
74. Id.
75. Bates v. Armstrong, 603 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 167).
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76

makes the scope of such permission irrelevant.
Minnesota’s
interpretation of the SRA using the initial permission rule is consistent
77
with trends in other jurisdictions and the “weight of authority.”
2. The Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act
78

The legislature passed the No-Fault Act in 1974, and codified it as
79
Minnesota Statutes sections 65B.41 to 65B.71 in 1978. The purpose of
the No-Fault Act was to stay the “[t]he detrimental impact of automobile
accidents on uncompensated injured persons [and] upon the orderly and
80
efficient administration of justice . . . .” To effectuate this purpose, the
No-Fault Act requires motor vehicle owners to provide a plan of
81
reparation security, such as liability insurance. The Act also specifies
82
The net effect of the Nominimum coverage amounts and benefits.
Fault Act is a guarantee of prompt payment regardless of who caused an
83
accident.
However, Minnesota’s system does not truly disregard
84
An accident victim must meet certain tort thresholds and then
fault.
sue the at-fault party for any non-economic losses or losses that exceed
85
policy limits.
Although the legislature has enforced state policy
through various laws, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in adopting the
initial permission rule, created an exception for instances of
86
conversion.

76. See id.
77. See Wiglesworth v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 917 P.2d 288, 291-92 (Colo. 1996)
(citing cases adopting the initial permission rule in Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, and West Virginia); Konrad v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 137 N.E.2d
855, 861 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) (stating that Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and probably North Dakota, Oregon, Oklahoma, Florida,
Indiana, and West Virginia follow the initial permission rule).
78. 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 408.
79. MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71 (1978).
80. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (2002).
81. MINN. STAT. § 65B.48 subd. 1 (2002).
82. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49 (2002).
83. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (2002).
84. See Luna v. Zeeb, 633 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating a
plaintiff must prove “$4,000 of medical expenses or an injury producing a disability of
sixty days or more, a permanent injury or disfigurement, or death” and then sue to
recover non-economic losses).
85. See id.
86. See Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2003)
(explaining the initial permission rule).
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E. Conversion
1. Generally
The tort of conversion grew from the early common law action of
87
trover, under which a plaintiff alleged that she lost a chattel that the
88
defendant found and converted to his own use. Eventually, losing and
finding became a fiction, and courts extended trover to cover any
89
interference with an owner’s possessory rights. In the United States,
the modern tort of conversion may have emerged in Johnson v.
90
Weedman.
Following precedent such as Johnson, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 222 states that where a dispossession seriously
interferes with another’s possessory right, the actor may be subject to
91
liability for conversion. The terms “seriously interferes” and “may be”
92
According to the
add complexity to the application of conversion.
Restatement comments, conversion “has been limited to those exercises
of dominion or control over the chattel which so seriously interfere with
another’s right to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay
93
the full value of the chattel.”
To qualify as a serious interference, a
person must have acted with the intent “to deal with the chattel [so] as to
94
deprive the other of its possession.” This does not require the intent to
commit a conversion, but requires knowledge that the act is “destructive
95
of any outstanding possessory right . . . .”
For example, if a person
destroyed a borrowed car by negligently striking a tree, there would be
96
Accordingly,
no conversion unless the destruction was intentional.
while negligence might result in the destruction of an owner’s chattel,
87. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 69 (4th ed. 2001).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 cmt. a (1965) (stating the basis
was a “fiction of losing and finding”).
89. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 15, at 89.
90. 5 Ill. 495, 496-97 (Ill. 1843) (finding no conversion for a claim of trover where
“the plaintiff bailed a horse to the defendant to be agisted and fed . . . and without the
plaintiff’s authority, [the defendant] rode the horse fifteen miles [and] the horse died
within a few hours afterwards, but not in consequence of the riding.”). Counsel for the
defendant was Abraham Lincoln. Id. at 496.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 (1965).
92. See generally id. at cmts. a-f. (1965) (discussing the application of the rule and
giving explanatory examples).
93. Id. at cmt. a.
94. Id. at cmt. b.
95. Id. at cmt. c.
96. See id. at cmt. b, illus. 1.
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negligence is not conversion absent the intent to interfere with the
97
owner’s possessory right.
2. In Minnesota
Minnesota courts have consistently defined conversion as “an act of
wilful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification, by
98
which any person entitled thereto is deprived of use and possession.”
In 1978, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied upon the Restatement
99
(Second) of Torts section 222 in Herrmann v. Fossum.
Thus,
Minnesota limited conversion to situations where an actor intended to
seriously interfere with an owner’s right to possess and control a
100
chattel.
The Christensen decision changed “conversion” in the
101
context of motor vehicle liability.
III. THE CHRISTENSEN CASE
A. Facts
Appellant Harvey Christensen worked for Independent School
102
ISD
District Number 787 (“ISD”) as a drivers’ education instructor.
103
owned and provided a van for Christensen to use for that instruction.
Christensen had permission to park the van at his home, but not to use
104
the van for personal reasons.
On July 1, 1994, Christensen completed
105
Throughout
instruction at noon and drove home to wash ISD’s van.
106
At about 6:30
that afternoon Christensen drank a number of beers.
107
p.m. Christensen took a cooler of beer and went for a drive in the van.

97. Id. at cmt. b.
98. Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226 Minn. 315, 317, 32 N.W.2d 649,
650 (1948). See Dain Bosworth Inc. v. Goetze, 374 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985).
99. 270 N.W.2d 18, 20-21 (Minn. 1978) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 222 (1965)).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222; Larson, 226 Minn. at 317, 32
N.W.2d at 650.
101. See infra Part V.B.
102. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 2003).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 582-83.
105. Id. at 582.
106. Id. at 583.
107. Id.
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After drinking more beer between 6:30 p.m. and 8:15 p.m.,
Christensen destroyed the van when he collided with Veronica Wagner
109
on State Highway 10 at 8:30 p.m.
Wagner and her passengers sued
110
Christensen and ISD for damages resulting from the accident.
111
Christensen pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol.
ISD held insurance through the Minnesota School Board
112
Association Insurance Trust (“MSBAIT”).
Christensen had personal
insurance for his own car through Milbank Mutual Insurance Company
113
(“Milbank”).
The MSBAIT policy provided coverage for vehicles
ISD owned, but for unowned vehicles it limited coverage to debts
114
The
remaining after all other collectible insurance policies had paid.
115
Milbank policy provided similar coverage.
MSBAIT initially
116
defended ISD and Christensen, but later tendered defense to Milbank.
Milbank refused the tender, arguing that because ISD owned the van
117
MSBAIT should be the first to pay claims.
Christensen settled the suit for $78,000 pursuant to a loan receipt
118
MSBAIT conditioned the loan receipt upon
from MSBAIT.
Christensen’s promise to seek declaratory relief against Milbank for
costs and attorney’s fees arising from the original and declaratory
119
actions.
Christensen sought declaratory relief and summary judgment
120
against Milbank for breach of duty to defend and indemnify him.
B. Hennepin County District Court
The District Court of Hennepin County entered judgment for
121
Three facts were prominent in the court’s analysis: (1) it
Christensen.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 643 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
111. Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 583 n.1.
112. Id. at 583.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The record does not state why MSBAIT tendered the defense to Milbank.
However, the language in the policies indicates ISD’s insurance would be the default
policy. MSBAIT probably presumed that Christensen was outside the scope of ISD’s
permission, and not covered as a permissive user of the van. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 583-84.
120. Id. at 584.
121. Id.
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was undisputed that Christensen had permission to use ISD’s van, (2) the
omnibus clause in the MSBAIT policy stated that permissive drivers
were plan participants, and (3) the initial permission rule contained a
122
“conversion or theft” exception.
Thus, unless Christensen converted
the van, ISD would be vicariously liable and the MSBAIT policy would
123
cover Christensen.
After considering general definitions of
conversion, the court held that Christensen converted the van when he
124
took the vehicle, failed to return it, and destroyed it.
C. Minnesota Court of Appeals
125

The court of appeals reversed the district court decision.
In
making this decision, the court looked to the SRA, the initial permission
126
The court highlighted Minnesota’s policy to
rule, and precedent.
“ensure members of the public injured by the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle ‘an approximate certainty of an effective recovery’ when
127
liability would not otherwise exist.”
The court of appeals argued that
the district court’s definition of conversion was overly broad and did not
128
effectuate state policy.
The court then stated that the supreme court
had not defined “conversion” within the context of the initial permission
129
130
rule,
but that conversion was an intentional tort.
Based on this
reasoning, the court held that “in a situation in which the property is
destroyed, conversion may be shown only if the destruction was
131
intentional.”
As all parties agreed that Christensen did not intend to
132
133
Also, because
destroy ISD’s van, the court found no conversion.
the scope of permission was irrelevant under the initial permission rule,
the court did not find conversion in Christensen’s use of the van for
134
135
personal reasons.
Christensen appealed,
and the Minnesota
122. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 643 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 644-45.
126. See id. at 642-44.
127. Id. at 642 (quoting Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
332 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Minn. 1983)).
128. See id. at 642-43.
129. Id. at 643.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 644.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 2003).
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Supreme Court granted review to consider what constitutes “conversion”
136
under the “conversion or theft” exception to the initial permission rule.
D. Minnesota Supreme Court
In a five-to-two split decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court
137
for entry of summary judgment for Milbank.
The supreme court explained that the SRA and omnibus clauses
138
exist to extend liability insurance to permissive drivers.
The court
then stated that its own role was to determine the meaning of “scope of
139
permission.”
The opinion began with three arguments supporting the
140
The first argument was that the initial
initial permission rule.
141
Next, the court
permission rule supports the policy behind the SRA.
pointed to a trend of interpreting the SRA and omnibus clauses to
“[favor] protection of the uncompensated victims of automobile
accidents over any interest of an owner-insured or his insurer that he be
not subject to liability when his permittee exceeds the scope of the initial
142
permission.”
Finally, the court stated its reliance on legislative history
143
(such as the No-Fault Act).
After justifying the initial permission rule, the court considered
144
whether Christensen’s actions constituted conversion.
Although
145
Christensen argued that intent was immaterial to finding conversion,
146
the court agreed with Milbank that intent was a key element.
In
defining conversion, the court looked to case law definitions and
147
The court concluded that “[a] wrongful intent
Restatement comments.
to appropriate chattel for one’s own purposes is the essence of the
148
‘conversion or theft’ exception.”
The supreme court refused to adopt
the court of appeals’ intentional destruction requirement because it
136. Id.
137. Id. at 588-89.
138. Id. at 584.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 585.
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332
N.W.2d 160, 166-67 (Minn. 1983)).
143. See id. at 585.
144. Id. at 585-86.
145. Id. at 585.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 585-86.
148. Id. at 586.
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149

would unnecessarily narrow the meaning of conversion.
However, the
court agreed that accidental destruction of the van could not supply the
150
requisite intent for conversion.
The court further found that
Christensen’s use of the van for personal reasons, without permission
and under the influence of alcohol, did not show intent to deprive ISD of
151
its right to use or control the van.
Finding no intent for conversion,
the court heeded the SRA and applied the initial permission rule to hold
152
ISD vicariously liable for Christensen’s conduct.
Chief Justice Blatz, joined in dissent by Justice Page, argued that
Christensen’s decision to drink and drive provided the requisite intent for
153
conversion.
The dissent favored a strict reading of conversion
154
definitions.
Citing a definition from Larson v. Archer-Daniels155
the dissent implied that because ISD did not give
Midland Co.,
Christensen authority to drink and drive and Christensen knew the limits
156
imposed by ISD, drinking and driving constituted willful interference.
Furthermore, because Christensen broke the law by driving under the
157
Finally, accidental or
influence, he was without lawful justification.
not, Christensen destroyed the vehicle and deprived ISD of its use and
158
possession of the van.
The dissent admonished the majority for
interpreting the Restatement’s phrasing, “intention to deal with the
159
chattel so that such dispossession results,”
to mean “intent to
160
The dissent argued
appropriate chattel for one’s own purposes . . . .”
161
and
that such interpretation redefined conversion to mean theft,
162
reduced the “conversion or theft” exception to a theft exception.
In rebutting the dissent, the majority explained that if drinking and
driving constituted conversion, the initial permission rule would preclude
163
coverage for uninsured permittees.
The majority stated that such a
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 587.
153. Id. at 588.
154. Id.
155. Id. See Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. 226 Minn. 315, 317, 32 N.W.2d
649, 650 (1948).
156. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 588.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 586.
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decision would contravene state policy to provide recovery to injured
164
The court expressed concern that the dissent’s opinion might
people.
165
exempt many negligent behaviors such as drag-racing or speeding.
In
addition, the court noted that driving under the influence is not
negligence per se, so the dissenting opinion would negate insurance
166
coverage for non-negligent behaviors.
The court supported these
arguments with persuasive authority from the Colorado Supreme Court,
which held that “even ‘ludicrous’ uses are within the insured’s
167
permission as long as they do not constitute theft or conversion.”
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Christensen court correctly interpreted legislative intent and
state policy by refusing to relieve vehicle owners of liability where a
permittee exceeds initial permission. However, the decision lacks
important information, such as whether state policy is well founded, the
purpose of the “conversion or theft” exception, and the limits of the new
“conversion” definition. The answers to these questions hold the key to
the Christensen decision.
A. Foundations of State Policy
Christensen succumbs to the hefty weight of Minnesota’s historical
168
focus on accident victims.
The policy behind the SRA was to make
motor vehicle owners liable to those injured by permissive drivers when
no liability would otherwise exist, and to provide certainty of recovery
169
for injured parties.
In addition, Minnesota “favors protection of the
uncompensated victims of automobile accidents over any interest of an
owner-insured or his insurer that he be not subject to liability when his
170
permittee exceeds the scope of the initial permission.”
The supreme
164. See id. at 587.
165. Id. at 586.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 587 (quoting Raitz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 1179, 1187
n.15 (Colo. 1998)).
168. See id. at 585-87 (relying on MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (2002); Milbank Mut. Ins.
Co. v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1983); Larson v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226 Minn. 315, 32 N.W.2d 649 (1948); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 (1965)).
169. See, e.g., Hutchings v. Bourdages, 291 Minn. 211, 214, 189 N.W.2d 706, 70809 (1971).
170. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 166-67. See also Schwalich v. Guenther,
282 Minn. 504, 507, 166 N.W.2d 74, 78 (1969) (stating the SRA effected legislative
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court adopted the initial permission rule because public policies required
171
The initial permission rule satisfied
liberal interpretation of the SRA.
this requirement by holding owners liable regardless of deviation from
172
initial permission.
As a result, the interests of Minnesota employers
173
and vehicle owners took a back seat to state policy.
1. Defense Against the “Deep Pocket”
Minnesota’s policy and laws enforce the “deep pocket” theory of
174
While offering a practical means of recovery for injured
recovery.
persons, the “deep pocket” theory retains a twinge of unfairness from the
175
However, the loss-distribution attribute
time of masters and servants.
176
of liability insurance substantially changes the “deep pocket” theory.
policy that the owner should bear the cost of injuries to third parties).
171. See, e.g., Jones v. Fleischhacker, 325 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 1982) (stating
the SRA must be given liberal interpretation to “achieve the purpose of giving to persons
injured by the negligent operation of automobiles an approximate certainty of an effective
recovery . . .”). See Bates v. Armstrong, 603 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(stating that Minnesota courts use the initial permission rule to interpret the SRA, and
that a liberal interpretation of the SRA protects injured parties).
172. See Bates, 603 N.W.2d at 681 (defining the initial permission rule).
173. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 165-66 (stating state policy focuses
on victims instead of drivers, that the SRA effectuates state policy, and that the initial
permission rule “alone guarantees fulfillment of the state’s policy of compensating
innocent accident victims from financial disaster.”).
174. See Balderrama v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 324 N.W.2d 355, 358 (Minn. 1982)
(considering whether the No-Fault Act is a “deep pocket for those avoiding their own
responsibilities in operating motor vehicles,” and rejecting the idea); Ossenfort v.
Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 687 (Minn. 1977) (holding an
employer liable when an employee caused a motor vehicle accident and expressing
concern that the holding could be seen as being based on the employer’s “deep pocket”);
Frank W. Hackett, Is Master Liable for Tort of Servant?, 7 HARV. L. REV. 107, 112
(1893) (questioning vicarious liability and concluding the master is “able to respond with
his money,” and that “[w]e see no hardship in making him pay the bills”).
175. See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785
(1973) (stating that we seek to compensate injured people, but are hesitant to impose
liability on an employer who did not directly cause the injury); Elliason v. W. Coal &
Coke Co., 162 Minn. 213, 219, 202 N.W. 485, 488 (1925) (“Charging [the master] with
the fault of the servant is a purely arbitrary act of the law.”) (quoting Hackett, supra note
174, at 111); P.S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (1967)
(“[G]enerations of lawyers have felt in some uneasy way that there is something so odd
or exceptional about vicarious liability that it needs justification . . . .”); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 499 (stating vicarious liability imputes negligence to an “additional,
albeit innocent, defendant”).
176. See Buglioli v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, 811 F. Supp. 105, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(stating courts will apply loss-distribution rules in motor vehicle accident cases); ATIYAH,
supra note 175, at 14-15 (stating that fault is irrelevant and insurance spreads accident
costs to taxpayers and to the motoring community).
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In procuring liability insurance, each insured pays a relatively small fee
to gain indemnity from accident claims and litigation; so what began as
the deep pocket of a single employer has become a societal blanket
177
covering all motorists.
Mandatory insurance laws, omnibus clauses, and Minnesota’s SRA
178
followed the success and practicality of liability insurance.
Today the
law seems less concerned with blaming vehicle owners than with
providing a means of compensation and medical attention to the
179
injured.
Of course the system is imperfect; an owner’s premium may
rise, some people may become uninsurable, and many vehicle owners
180
From a broad
refuse to maintain insurance despite the laws.
perspective, the assurance that society will care for injured accident
victims who face financial ruin makes such issues a small price to pay
181
and justifies favoring the injured.
2. Justifying the Initial Permission Rule
The minor deviation rule used scope of permission to limit liability
182
In 1983, the Minnesota Supreme
under the SRA and omnibus clauses.
Court adopted the initial permission rule, noting a “trend toward the
expansion of omnibus clauses” and an increase in social concern to

177. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 2 (1986).
178. See supra Part II.
179. See Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2003)
(stating public policy is to protect injured victims); Milbrandt v. Am. Legion Post of
Mora, 372 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Minn. 1985) (stating that under the No-Fault Act an insurer
“has a duty to pay basic economic loss benefits to its insured without regard to fault”);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 615 (stating compensation may now be paid on the basis
of strict accountability rather than fault).
180. See Rehnelt v. Stuebe, 397 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Minn. 1986) (pertaining to a
plaintiff who refused to carry no-fault insurance); Balderrama v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co.,
324 N.W.2d 355, 358 (Minn. 1982) (“[P]ersons must contribute premiums to the
insurance pool; otherwise, responsible persons carrying insurance become the insurers of
those unwilling to pay . . . .”); Nelson v. Hartz Truckline, 401 N.W.2d 436, 437 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (regarding an over-the-road truck driver being discharged because his
driving record rendered him uninsurable).
181. See Glockel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 400 N.W.2d 250, 258 (Neb.
1987) (stating compulsory insurance laws “evidence a policy of protecting the innocent
victims of automobile accidents from financial ruin”); David A. Fischer & Robert H.
Jerry, II, Teaching Torts Without Insurance: A Second-Best Solution, 45 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 857, 862 (2001) (stating that “the benefits provided by liability insurance are also
enormous,” and “liability insurance gives individuals and firms some measure of security
against the risk of financial ruin . . . .”).
182. See supra Part II.
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183

provide compensation to injured parties.
The court also noted that
insurance companies were willing to provide broader coverage in lieu of
184
high litigation costs.
Under the No-Fault Act, a motorist must carry liability insurance,
185
Thus, when an
including provisions for uninsured motorists.
uninsured motorist causes an accident, the victim’s own insurance
186
company provides compensation.
Because insurance is mandatory
and the victim’s policy provides coverage, the purpose of discarding the
minor deviation rule in favor of the initial permission rule comes into
question. One rationale is that the tremendous number of motor vehicle
187
Courts following the
accidents presents limitless factual situations.
minor deviation rule must determine case-by-case whether a motorist
188
was within the scope of permission.
Because litigation is expensive
and time-consuming, expeditious claim settlement serves the interests of
189
the state and the litigating parties.
Another problem arises when
courts relinquish liability based on deviations from the scope of
190
Medical treatment, rehabilitation programs, and an
permission.
inability to work may lead to financial ruin for permittees and their
191
victims.
Even where the permittee injures a driver who has no-fault
192
The injured
insurance, serious injury could exceed policy coverage.
party could then directly sue the uninsured permittee, which may only
193
add unpaid legal fees to unpaid hospital bills.
By holding vehicle
183. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 165
n.7 (Minn. 1983).
184. Id.
185. MINN. STAT. § 65B.41-.71 (2002).
186. MINN. STAT. § 65B.43 (2002).
187. See supra note 11.
188. See Am. Fid. Co. v. N. British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 204 A.2d 110, 114 (Vt.
1964) (Shangraw, J., concurring) (stating the minor deviation rule “breeds litigation”).
189. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (2002); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
408 S.E.2d 358, 364 (W. Va. 1991) (stating the initial permission rule “best effectuates
the legislative policy of providing certain and maximum coverage, and is consistent with
the language of the standard omnibus clause automobile liability insurance policies”
(quoting Matis v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 166 A.2d 345, 349 (1960)).
190. See Verriest v. INA Underwriters Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 967, 972 (N.J. 1995).
191. See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 17 (Fla. 1974) (stating no-fault
laws stave off financial ruin by providing prompt reimbursement for essential out-ofpocket losses); Verriest, 662 A.2d at 972; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaRoque,
486 N.W.2d 235, 241 (N.D. 1992) (stating the purpose of financial responsibility laws is
to protect victims of motor vehicle accidents from financial ruin).
192. See MINN. STAT. 65B.49 subd. 3a (2002) (requiring only $25,000 of uninsured
motorist coverage for injury or death).
193. See Rehnelt v. Stuebe, 397 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Minn. 1986); Kleeman v.
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owners liable for the acts of permittees regardless of scope of permission,
the initial permission rule supports state policy and makes use of the
194
insurance infrastructure.
Thus, the number, complexity, and
seriousness of motor vehicle accidents, the benefits of limiting litigation,
and social policies demanding coverage for the injured justify the initial
195
permission rule in Minnesota.
B. Examination of the Law
1. Conversion in the Context of the Initial Permission Rule
The Christensen court applied the initial permission rule and
refused to find conversion even where a permissive driver’s intentional
and negligent act resulted in the destruction of a vehicle and injuries to
196
The SRA was the basis for the decision, and states that
third parties.
anyone using a vehicle with the owner’s permission is the owner’s
197
The supreme court interpreted the SRA using the initial
agent.
198
permission rule to make scope of permission irrelevant.
The single
199
exception to the rule is where the court finds “theft or conversion.”
Although the court adopted the initial permission rule to guarantee
200
recovery to injured parties and reduce litigation,
the exception is
justified because permission, not scope of permission, is the bright line
201
This rationale for requiring permission
courts use to limit liability.
stems from the negligence and foreseeability test of respondeat
202
superior.
While the general purpose of the initial permission rule is to
Cadwell, 414 N.W.2d 433, 440 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (Randall, J., concurring specially)
(“In a complex personal injury or products liability case . . . out of pocket costs for
discovery and experts through a trial can run into thousands of dollars.”).
194. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160,
166 (Minn. 1983) (adopting the initial permission rule to effectuate state policy by
holding owners and their insurers liable to injured accident victims).
195. See generally MINN. STAT. 65B.41-.71; Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658
N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 2003); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 160.
196. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 586-87.
197. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (2002).
198. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 162; Bates v. Armstrong, 603 N.W.2d
679, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
199. See Bates, 603 N.W.2d at 682 (“[T]he conduct required to terminate permission
must be tantamount to theft or conversion.”).
200. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 166.
201. See Bates, 603 N.W.2d at 681 (“Liability depends not on the scope of
permission, but on whether permission was given in the first instance.”).
202. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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make scope of permission irrelevant when interpreting the SRA and
omnibus clauses, the “conversion or theft” exception negates liability
where a vehicle owner has given no permission and therefore has not
203
been negligent.
In Christensen, the majority, the dissent, and the parties argued over
the purpose of conversion within the context of the initial permission
204
rule.
The central dispute was whether and what type of intent the
205
Christensen mistakenly
court should require for finding conversion.
206
argued that intent was irrelevant.
Conversion is an intentional tort and
207
In addition, “[m]ere proof of the
by definition requires intent.
happening of an accident is not enough to establish negligence or its
208
causal relation to the damage.”
The dissent argues that by requiring
“intent to appropriate chattel for one’s own purposes” the majority
209
The dissent would follow the
redefines conversion to mean theft.
Restatement and case law definitions of conversion that require only the
intent to deprive an owner of use and possession through dominion, or
210
control.
Such definitions would allow courts to find conversion after a
211
vehicle owner granted permission.
According to the majority, finding
conversion after an uninsured and intoxicated driver received initial
212
The majority states that if
permission would conflict with state policy.
driving under the influence constituted conversion, courts might
213
withhold relief even where the driver was not negligent.
The majority
cites Minnesota law and precedent under which driving while intoxicated

203. See supra notes 201, 202 and accompanying text. See also Verriest v. INA
Underwriters Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 967, 972 (N.J. 1995) (stating that two questions will
determine coverage: (1) whether an owner gave initial permission, and (2) whether
subsequent use constituted theft or the like).
204. See Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 585-88 (Minn. 2003).
205. See id. at 585-88.
206. Id. at 585.
207. See Herrmann v. Fossum, 270 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Minn. 1978) (stating conversion
is an intentional tort).
208. State v. Paskewitz, 233 Minn. 452, 461, 47 N.W.2d 199, 204 (1951).
209. Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 588 (Blatz, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
210. See id.; Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226 Minn. 315, 317, 32 N.W.2d
649, 650 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 cmt. a (1965).
211. See sources cited supra note 210.
212. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 586 (stating that following the dissent’s opinion
would preclude recovery for accident victims).
213. See id. (arguing that because traffic violations are not negligent per se, finding
conversion for intoxicated driving would preclude coverage without negligence (citing
MINN. STAT. § 169.96 (2002))).
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214

is evidence of negligence, not negligence per se.
Such arguments
complicate the matter, however, and other jurisdictions provide insight
215
into the Christensen decision.
The majority opinion is consistent with jurisdictions where the
216
exception is not “conversion or theft,” but “theft or the like.”
Legislative intent in these jurisdictions is to except only situations
217
involving no express or implied permission.
In fact, Nebraska derived
their “theft or conversion” exception directly from the “theft or the like”
218
exception in Illinois and New Jersey.
214. See id. at 586-87 (citing MINN. STAT. § 169.96(b)); Raitz v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 1179, 1183, 1187, n.15 (Colo. 1998); Wiglesworth v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 917 P.2d 288, 292 (Colo. 1996); Kedrowski v. Czech, 244 Minn. 111, 118, 69
N.W.2d 337, 342 (1955); Kirsebom v. Connelly, 486 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); Mueller v. Sigmond, 486 N.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
215. See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
216. In Mattis v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 166 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1961), the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that “if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in
the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his
possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use . . . .”
The court reaffirmed this holding in Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 264
A.2d 38, 42 (N.J. 1970). Mattis and Odolecki form the basis for many jurisdictions that
recognize, if not adopt, the “theft or the like” exception. See Mt. Beacon Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 296 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (D. Md. 1969) (refusing to adopt the initial
permission rule but recognizing the exception stated in Mattis, 166 A.2d 345); Raitz v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 1179, 1185 (Colo. 1998) (citing Odolecki, 264
A.2d at 42); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 297 N.E.2d 163, 167 (Ill.
1973) (citing Odolecki, 264 A.2d at 42); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Lanoha
Landscape Nursery, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Neb. 1996) (citing Odolecki, 264 A.2d at
42); Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Collins, 730 A.2d 833, 837 (N.J. 1999) (citing Tooker v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 319 A.2d 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (citing
Odolecki, 264 A.2d at 42)); Am. Fid. Co. v. N. British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 204 A.2d
110, 114 (Vt. 1964) (Shangraw, J., concurring) (citing Drechsler, supra note 41, at 62936; Mattis, 166 A.2d at 345); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 408 S.E.2d 358,
364 (W. Va. 1991) (citing Mattis, 166 A.2d at 349). Other jurisdictions recognize the
“theft or the like” exception, though by other means. See Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Abdullah, 156 Cal. Rptr. 254, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., Inc.
v. Vicente, 891 P.2d 1041, 1052 (Haw. 1995) (citing Columbia Cas. Co. v. Hoohuli, 437
P.2d 99, 103 (Haw. 1968)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 788 P.2d 340, 345 (N.M. 1990).
217. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Kendle, 318 N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ill. Ct. App. 1974)
(stating “theft and the like” includes only situations where there is no permission from the
insured owner).
218. Allstate Ins. Co., 788 P.2d at 345 n.4 (stating that some courts list “conversion”
as an exception but that the court’s “research indicates . . . only one court has addressed
the meaning of conversion in this context and has rejected the application of the
definition of tortious conversion to the exception recognized”); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d at 740 (restating the initial permission rule exception as “theft or
conversion” after adopting the rule from jurisdictions that recognize a “theft or the like”
exception).
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The dissent is correct that under general definitions of conversion
Christensen converted the van through a willful and illegal act that
219
deprived ISD of its possessory rights.
However, because the purpose
of the conversion exception is to limit liability where a vehicle owner did
not grant permission, legislative intent and state policy do not support the
220
dissent opinion in the context of motor vehicle liability.
ISD gave
221
The exceptions to the initial
Christensen permission to use the van.
222
Thus, the
permission rule apply only in absence of permission.
majority was correct in finding no conversion.
2. Effects of the Christensen Decision
Prior to Christensen, motor vehicle owners were not liable for
injuries that occurred materially outside the scope of permission where
223
common law conversion disarmed the SRA and omnibus clauses.
Now, owners who give permission to drive their vehicles are liable for
224
subsequent injuries, with virtually no exception.
Theft would preclude
liability; however, it is unlikely a court would find theft following a grant
225
of permission.
The Christensen decision is not limited to alcohol226
related incidents, and applies to vehicle liability cases generally.
227
Although the court’s analysis revolved around defining “conversion,”
the net effect was merely a clarification of legislative intent behind the
228
initial permission rule.
Thus, common law conversion should never
have been an exception to the initial permission rule, and remains
219. See supra Part II.D (discussing the dissent’s argument in favor of conversion).
220. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
221. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 2003).
222. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
223. See Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 643 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002) (“There are no supreme court cases defining the term ‘conversion’ when used in
this context.”). Previous cases considering conversion in the context of the SRA and
initial permission rule used the common law definition of conversion. See Herrmann v.
Fossum, 270 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. 1978); Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226
Minn. 315, 317, 32 N.W.2d 649, 650 (1948).
224. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 588. There have been no reported cases
absolving a vehicle owner from liability in Minnesota since Christensen. It remains to be
seen if any factual situations beyond theft will become exceptions to the rule.
225. See id. See also 7 AM. JUR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 111 (2002) (stating that
when an insured gives consent to use his or her vehicle, such consent may preclude
coverage for theft).
226. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 586-87 (expressing concern over drag-racing,
speeding, and other “ludicrous” vehicle uses).
227. See id. at 585-86.
228. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
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229

V. WARMING UP TO VEHICLE OWNERS: A PROPOSED PLAN
The Christensen decision may have a negative impact on employers
and others who will hesitate to grant permission for business and other
230
beneficial purposes.
While more lenient methods, such as the minor
231
deviation rule, increase litigation and ultimately inhibit state policy,
232
current laws may create unfair situations.
With Minnesota’s policy in
mind, the supreme court correctly chose the initial permission rule, and
233
Moving
correctly defined the role of conversion within that rule.
forward, the legislature must give consideration to business practices and
the interests of vehicle owners. One option is to take a stance between
234
the minor deviation rule and the initial permission rule.
However,
235
Minnesota policy backs the initial permission rule, and a better choice
may be to create an exception that fulfills state policy while allowing

229. See id. The words of Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens) characterize this issue
well: “The difference between the almost right word and the right word is really a large
matter—’tis the difference between the lightening-bug and the lightning.” Letter from
Mark Twain to George Bainton (undated), in THE ART OF AUTHORSHIP, LITERARY
REMINISCENCES, METHODS OF WORK, AND ADVICE TO YOUNG BEGINNERS, PERSONALLY
CONTRIBUTED BY LEADING AUTHORS OF THE DAY, at 87-88 (George Bainton ed., 1890).
230. Cf. Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 588 (Blatz, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating vehicle owners will be liable in every circumstance except
theft).
231. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 175.
233. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 585-86 (discussing the reasons for adopting the
initial permission rule and definition of conversion). Thomas Jefferson once wrote:
With your talents and industry, with science, and that stedfast honesty
which eternally pursue right, regardless of consequences, you may
promise yourself everything—but health, without which there is no
happiness. An attention to health then should take place of every other
subject. The time necessary to secure this by active exercises, should
be devoted to it in preference to every other pursuit.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, Jr. (July 6, 1787) in 11 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 558 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955).
234. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., Inc. v. Vicente, 891 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Haw. 1995) (stating
the court will “construe the scope of permission more broadly than under the minor
deviation rule, [but will] not go so far as to construe it so broadly as to adopt the initial
permission rule”).
235. “[W]here the legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme of motor vehicle
legislation designed to assure that persons who cause automobile accidents are able to
answer financially to their innocent victims, the liberal or ‘initial permission’ rule . . .
should be adopted . . . .” 8 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE,
§113:9 (3d ed. 2003).
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vehicle owners a choice in liability. For example, the SRA could read:
Whenever any motor vehicle shall be operated within this state,
by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the
owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of
accident be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor
vehicle in operation thereof. Major departures from the initial
scope of permission, short of theft or the like, do not relieve the
owner from vicarious liability for the permittee’s negligent use
of the vehicle, except where a permittee insured in accordance
with state law expressly accepts liability on behalf of the
owner.
Under such a provision, employers could require employees to
accept liability and show proof of insurance before using company
vehicles. The employer’s insurance would cover business-related
vehicle use, while the employee’s insurance would cover personal use.
Friends and neighbors could loan and borrow vehicles after agreeing
which party’s insurance would be responsible for accident injuries. Such
amendments could tame any negative impact that state policy has on
society, yet assure recovery for injured persons.
This solution would require employers to define the scope of
236
On the other
employment, which has proven difficult in the past.
hand, even broad definitions of personal use such as driving after
drinking alcohol or driving a specified distance off-course could provide
a flexible guideline for courts. This solution may also increase litigation.
Individual vehicle owners and their permittees may disagree over who
was liable for accidents. Placing the burden of proof on the permittee to
show the owner accepted liability may limit such litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Christensen decision is the most recent link in Minnesota’s
long chain of vehicle owner liability cases. The Christensen court
essentially eliminated the initial permission rule’s conversion
237
exception.
This is a necessary extension of existing legal
interpretation, and owners who give initial permission should expect to

236. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 140 (Alaska 1972) (“‘[S]cope of employment’
[has] produced confusing and contradictory legal results . . . .”); id. at 141 (“[N]o
categorical statement can delimit the meaning of ‘scope of employment’ once and for all
times.”); Laurie v. Mueller, 78 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Minn. 1956) (“‘[S]cope of
employment’ is impossible of concrete definition . . . .”).
237. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 588.
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be vicariously liable for subsequent injuries in virtually every
238
instance.
The Christensen decision supports the goal of Minnesota policy and
239
tort law by ensuring compensation to injured accident victims.
However, legislative and judicial efforts have failed to create a
satisfactory balance between state policy and a general moral sense that
vehicle owners should not be penalized for another person’s wrongful
240
Furthermore, laws and rules purporting to serve the best
actions.
interests of society should not encourage people to distrust others for fear
of liability. The notion that vehicle owners can foresee and control a
241
permittee’s future acts is mere fiction used to justify risk-distribution.
Over the years, the legislature and courts have made great progress
toward protecting accident victims through policies, laws, and rules.
Now the laws must be refined until the system provides for the injured,
minimizes litigation, and allows businesses and individuals to use and
limit use of their motor vehicles as they see fit.

238.
239.
240.
241.

See id.
See supra note 2.
See supra note 175.
See sources cited supra note 16.
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